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RECENT CASES
TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS-USE OF MINIMUM SCORE ON
AS REQUIREMENT FOR HIRING AND RE-

STANDARDIZED EXAMINATION
TENTION

OF TEACHERS WHERE EXAMINATION

NOT REASONABLY RE-

LATED TO PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS OSTENSIBLY DESIGNED IS IMPERMISSIBLE AS VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

In a prayer for preliminary injunctive relief that was consolidated
by agreement of the parties with the trial on the merits, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had unlawfully refused to reemploy black
teachers and to hire black applicants for teaching positions through
the mechanism of School Board Policy 13-69. Plaintiffs were nine
black teachers (and two professional organizations of which they were
members) who claimed to have lost their jobs as a result of the implementation of the policy, which required teachers to achieve a minimum score on the Graduate Record Examination1 or to fulfill one
of several specified alternatives.2 The policy, found by the court. to
have been implemented in the wake of a desegregation order, 3 acted
to disqualify a disproportionate number of black teachers. The district court4 had held that a prima facie case of discrimination had

been established which required the school board to justify the requirements with an overriding purpose independent of the discrimination. Holding that the burden had not been sustained, the court enjoined the use of both the GRE scores and the alternative means of
satisfying Policy 13-69. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit on appeal declined to reach the issue of discrimination. While it affirmed that portion of the district court's opinion proscribing the use of the GRE
scores, it did so on the ground that the requirement was arbitrary.
Perhaps even more significantly, it reinstated the use of the alternative requirements of Policy 13-69, citing lack of evidence as to their
racial impact. Held: Irrespective of whether it creates a racial classification, the requirement of a minimum score on an examination
which is not designed to and cannot measure teacher competency and
which eliminates some good teachers is not reasonably related to the
purpose for which it was ostensibly designed and is violative of equal
I.
2.
3.
4.

Hereinafter referred to as the GRE.
See note 46 infra.
See text at footnote 56 infra.
Arrstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.

Miss. 1971).
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protection. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District,
461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972) .r
The standard by which qualifications for hiring and retention of
public employees are to be judged under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment is somewhat uncertain at present. The
confusion results from the disparate rules of law applicable to discrimination in public and private employment at the time of the
decision in the instant case. It will be necessary to examine the rather
unique symbiotic relationship shared by these two areas of law in
the course of their respective judicial histories in order to view the
holding of the instant case in its proper perspective.
Discrimination in public employment has been regulated by the
fourteenth amendment since its adoption in 1868, while that in private employment went largely unchecked until the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6 Although its full impact was not realized
until the Supreme Court rendered its historic decision in the case
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,7 Title VII of that Act extended protection in the area of private employment considerably beyond what
had been afforded in the area of public employment under the aegis
of the fourteenth amendment. By its own terms, however, Title VII
excluded public school teachers and other public employees from
the scope of its coverage.
Previous to Title VII, discrimination was viewed in subjective
and personal terms. A plaintiff would typically allege that he personally had been discriminated against on the basis of his race, religion, or national origin." Of prime concern to the resolution of the
case was the intention of the defendant. By contrast, in Title VII,
Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that,
Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. 9
5. Hereinafter referred to as instant case.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) aff'd per curiam, 352
U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954) a§'d,
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.) ree'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), reeid, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.) af'd per
curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
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Also,
[t]he Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.10

In cases decided under the fourteenth amendment, statutes generally enjoy a presumption of constitutionality." The first test which
a challenged statute must undergo is one for arbitrariness, 2 known as
the "lenient" or "rational relation" test. Under this test, any statute
is permissible which is reasonably designed to effectuate some legitimate state interest. 13 However, if a statute infringes upon a recognized "fundamental right'

4

or embodies a "suspect classification,"' 1

a "stringent" or "exacting" test'16 is employed which mandates exacting judicial scrutiny.17 Under this test, the state must demonstrate
some overriding statutory purpose for the "suspect" classification
without which it is "reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause."' 3 Additionally, such suspect classifications are not entitled to the presumption of constitutionality
normally enjoyed by legislation.' 9 Moreover, a classification which
trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidous
official discrimination based on race . . .bears a heavy burden of
justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not

merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy 2 0
It is evident that this latter "stringent" test is a considerably
more formidable obstacle than the "lenient" test of rational relationship. This stringent test usually has been applied in cases where
distinction on the basis of race was evident on the face of a statute,
10.
in some
11.
12.

Id. at 431 (emphasis added). The concept of business necessity is examined
detail elsewhere in this writing. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
See Gulf Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).

13. Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
14. See Shapirov. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
15. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
16. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).

17. Id. at 626.
18. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
19. Id. at 191; Hirabayashiv. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
20. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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amounting to invidious discrimination, 2' or when an otherwise neutral statute was unequally enforced among members of different
races. 22 But in 1969, the Supreme Court barred the institution of a
literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the test would
indirectly abridge the right to vote on the basis of race, because of
the inferior education that plaintiff blacks had received in North
Carolina. 23 It is true that the statute in question was neutral on its
face as to race and could be linked to racial classifications only by
indirect and extrinsic evidence. However, it dealt with the right to
vote, previously held to be so fundamental that this alone would have
mandated the "exacting judicial scrutiny" test for justification. 24 Thus
rarely and only quite recently has any statute not discriminatory on
its face been invalidated under an equal protection challenge.
By contrast, in directing the thrust of Title VII to the consequences of discrimination in private employment, Congress intended
that the apparent racial neutrality of a requirement imposed for employment not be decisive of its permissibility. Both the lower court"
and the Fourth Circuit 26 on appeal had held in Griggs that in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, the use of requirements which
operated to disqualify a disproportionate number of Negroes was
permitted under Title VII even without a showing that such requirements were job related. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that
any such requirement mandates a showing of business necessity.2 7 The
racial neutrality of the requirement, the impartiality of its enforcement, and the subjective intent of the employer in its implementation are all irrelevant to a determination of the requirement's permissibility.
The scope of coverage under Title VII is thus far more comprehensive than any previously afforded under the fourteenth amendment. Rather than allege that he personally is being discriminated
against on the basis of some forbidden classification such as race, a
plaintiff now need only allege that he is part of a class whose mem21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
generally

See id.
Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625-30 (1969).
292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Business necessity has
been acknowledged to require something more than a mere business purpose.

See note 61 infra & accompanying text.
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bers are statistically disqualified at a greater rate than whites by the
classification in question. The burden then shifts to the employer to
show that the requirement has a "manifest relationship" 28 to the
employment or is "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. '29 In the absence of such showing, the requirement cannot stand. But the Griggs decision merely represented an interpretation of Title VII, a statute which was expressly limited to the area of
private employment. 30 Therefore, at the time of the instant case,
Griggs was of dubious applicability to fourteenth amendment challenges by employees in public education. 31
Subsequent to the decision in Griggs, but prior to the enactment
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197232 (which extended the protection of Title VII to public employees) federal
courts were confronted with a number of cases involving equal protection challenges to various qualifications imposed for public employment positions. The differing standards which were applied by
individual circuits can perhaps be explained by their apparent desire
to follow the rationale of a decision (Griggs) whose rule of law was
inapplicable to their respective cases. The language of equal protection must have seemed an inadequate base in which to ground a holding that would comply with the dictates of the Supreme Court in
Griggs. Should the employment requirements be judged by the "legitimate state interest" standard or by the more stringent "exacting judicial scrutiny" standard? What quantum of proof was necessary to sustain either? What did the concept of business necessity mean when
applied to the state rather than a private employer? Restrained by
language indigenous to "equal protection," and unable to borrow
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
29. Id. at 436.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). On March 24, 1972 Congress approved The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong.
2d Sess. at 814 (1972). Section 3 of the bill amends Section 702 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1962 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (Title VII)) effectively removing the exemption previously applicable to employees of nonreligious educational institutions who do
work connected with educational activities. According to the legislative history of the
bill:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor does any
national policy suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational
institution employees-primarily teachers-from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against minorities and women in the field of education is as pervasive as discrimination in any other area of employment.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. at 1023 (1972).
31. See supra note 30.
32. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Np.ws, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. at 814 (1972).
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from the language of Griggs, the courts in the cases which follow
reach decisions which, while in concert with Griggs, are each ostensibly decided on the strength of different standards of review.
Chance v. Board of Examiners3 was a class action in which
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of examinations administered by the board of examiners for permanent appointment to
supervisory positions in the New York City school system. The district
court found a "de facto effect of discrimination" in the disparity between the numbers of otherwise qualified blacks and whites who
failed to pass the examinations. It declared such a discriminatory
impact "constitutionally suspect"3 4 resulting in a burden on the
board to show that the examination was necessary.s 5 The court found
the examinations too subjective and not sufficiently job-related to be
permissible. In its affirmance, 36 the Second Circuit nicely defined the
important issues in the case, but shied away from a proper resolution: the court recognized the necessity of determining whether a
case of discrimination had been established, and if so, whether the
discrimination was permissible as sufficiently justified or perhaps even
as necessary. Yet the court stated:
Although state action invidiously discriminating on the basis of
race has long called for the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. U.S.,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Supreme Court has yet to apply
that stringent test to a case such as this, in which the allegedly unconstitutional action unintentionally resulted in discriminatory effects. . . . We think, however, that the district court's decision
may be upheld under the "more lenient equal protection standard"
and so find it unnecessary to reach this most difficult question."7
For the court properly to hold that the examination was impermissible
under the lenient equal protection standard, it would have had to
find that the test bore not the slightest rational relationship to its intended purpose. While it may be conceded that the examination was
one of low validity and placed too great an emphasis on memorization of detail, 38 it is difficult to support the position that the test
bore no relation whatever to teaching ability. Rather, the court's in33. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

34. Id. at 223.

35. Id.
36. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. Id. at 1177.
38. See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. at 220-22.
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validation of the examination on the lower equal protection standard
represents nothing more than an attempt to achieve a desired result
without applying the more exacting test to a case of incidental (as
opposed to intentional) discrimination.
By contrast, the First Circuit achieved the same result by equating the protection afforded by Title VII with that of the fourteenth
amendment. After noting that Griggs had been decided on the authority of Title VII, the court, in a case involving the legitimacy of allegedly discriminatory requirements in the hiring of policemen, 89
quoted that portion of Title VII, also quoted in Griggs, which prohibits classification
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race . . .or
national origin.40

The court concluded that
[w]ith the substitution of "applicants" for "employees," the quoted
statutory language not unfairly describes what we hold to be the
constitutional constraints on a public employer. We cannot conceive
that the words of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as it has been applied
41
in racial cases, demand anything less.
Indeed, the words of the fourteenth amendment have always been
held to prohibit classifications amounting to invidious discrimination on the basis of race, but not such unintentional discrimination
as might result from equally applied, though arguably unnecessary
employment requisites.
Instead of equating the protection afforded, the Fifth Circuit
equated the two types of discrimination involved. In Baker v. Columbus School District,4 a case which was decided three weeks after the
instant case and is remarkably similar in substance, the court, citing
Korematsu v. United States,43 stated that "[w]henever the effect of a
law or policy produces such a racial distortion it is subject to strict
scrutiny." 44 Realizing that Korematsu (a case involving intentional
discrimination) might not be authority for the standard of review
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970).
459 F.2d at 733.
462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
462 F.2d at 1114 (citations omitted).
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applicable in cases of incidental (unintentional) discrimination, the
court then noted:
Even though this policy does not on its face purport to classify along
racial lines as in Korematsu and in McLaughlin v. Florida, . . . its
effects can be just as devastating. In order to withstand an equal
justified by an overriding purpose indeprotection attack it must be
45
pendent of its racial effects.
Thus, in order to reach the same result in substantially similar
cases, we find the Second Circuit lowering the standard of review,
the First Circuit equating protection under the fourteenth amendment to that under Title VII, and the Fifth Circuit attempting to
obviate the distinction between unintentional and invidious discrimination. Although some of the aforementioned cases were decided a short time after the instant case, they indicate the prevailing
climate of confusion regarding the applicable standard of review in
cases involving incidental discrimination.
The instant case involved alleged discrimination in the implementation by the Starkville Mississippi School District of several alternative requirements for applicant and incumbent teachers. 40 The
45. Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
46. In April, 1968, Starkville adopted School Board Policy 13-69. The policy, as
amended in April and August of 1969, provided, inter alia, that in order to be considered
for a teaching position a candidate must submit:
d. An official transcript of the candidate's scores on the Graduate Record
Examination with a minimum score of 750 on the verbal and quantitative sections or a percentile score of 60 or above on the advanced section in education or the special subject field in which the candidate is endorsed to teach.
e. As an alternative to "d" above, a score of 500 on the commons section of
the National Teacher Examination and a score of 500 on the teaching fields
section of the NTE will give provisional status to the candidate until the
Graduate Record Examination score requirements are met.
f. As an alternative to "d" above, a teacher who holds a Master's Degree in
any field or who holds an AA Teaching Certificate will not be required to present GRE or NTE scores.
g. As an alternative to "d" above, a teacher who is enrolled in a graduate
school program of education which is designed to lead to the Master's Degrec
in Education, which might be completed within a two year period after employment, will not be required to present GRE scores, provided that onehalf of the required hours are earned during the first year of employment.
Teachers who were employed during the first year these regulations were in
effect will be allowed to qualify by acquiring the Master's Degree prior to
September, 1970.
h. A teacher who has not taken the Graduate Record Examination at the time
of interview for a position may be employed, subject to qualification on the
GRE and who agrees to take the GRE on the first available testing date.
Teachers who receive GRE scores, after employment, who do not qualify will
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requirements for retention of incumbent teachers, which were set
forth in School Board Policy 13-69 included the attainment of specified scores on the regular or advanced sections of the GRE. Alternatively, the policy requirements could have been satisfied by possession
of a master's degree or an AA teaching certificate (found by the district court to include, inter alia, the satisfaction of the requirements
for a masters degree) .4, The district court found a prima facie case
of discrimination 8 in that the disqualification of disproportionate
numbers of blacks to whites resulted from the imposition of Policy
13-69, 4 thereby placing a burden on the school system to show an
"overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination
which justifiies this classification." 50 The court cited Loving v. Virginia5r and McLaughlin v. Florida52 as authority, but once again, because both of these cases dealt with invidious discrimination, they
may not be competent authority for cases involving incidental discrimination. However, the court also held the requirement of a
minimum GRE score to be "arbitrary and unreasonable" as not substantially related to the actual requirements of the job.55 It was further found that
[t]he provisions of Policy 13-69 allowing in-service teachers to qualify for re-employment by obtaining a Master's Degree or an AA
have the assurance of serving only one year even though the GRE scores do
not meet the minimum requirements.
In addition to the above testing requirements for new teachers, incumbent
teachers were also compelled to meet similar criteria for retention. These
were as follows:
1. Teachers who are currently employed in the Starkville Public Schools
must attain a minimum combined score of 640 on the verbal and quantitative sections of the Graduate Record Examination.
2. As an alternative to "1" above, the teacher may qualify by ranking in
the 50th percentile, or higher, on the GRE in education or in the special
subject matter field in which the teacher is endorsed.
3. As an alternative to "1" above, a teacher may qualify by holding a
Master's Degree in any field or by holding an AA Teaching Certificate.
4. A teacher who does not hold a Master's Degree or an AA Teaching
Certificate, or who fails to score 640 on the GRE or who does not rank
in the 50th percentile, or higher, in the special subject matter field will be
allowed two calendar years in which to meet one of the requirements.
Instant case at 277-78.
47. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560, 56465 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
48. Id. at 571.
49. Id. at 570.
50. Id.
51. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
53. 325 F. Supp. at 570.
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Teaching Certificate as a practical matter, do not constitute a meaningful alternative to achieving the required minimum score on the
adGRE because similar or higher GRE scores were required 5 for
4
mission to graduate school at Mississippi State University.
Accordingly, the district court enjoined the utilization of Policy 13-69
by defendants in the selection and evaluation of teachers.
In its partial affirmance of the instant case, the Fifth Circuit
found it unnecessary to reach the issue of discrimination. It held that
the GRE requirement, which had not been designed as a test of
teaching proficiency but rather as an indicator of aptitude for graduate study, was not reasonably related to the purpose for which it was
designed, and was therefore invalid as arbitrary under the fourteenth
amendment standards. But the court reversed that part of the district court's opinion which enjoined the use of the master's and AA
Teaching Certificate, stating:
We, of course, have no information on how a requirement for an
AA Teaching Certificate or a Master's Degree would racially affect
the future of incumbent teachers. Even if the effect of such a requirement resulted in a racially unbalanced faculty, the School
Board would have to be given the opportunity to justify the use of
such requirements.55
The court apparently felt that the requirement of a master's degree
is not so demonstrably arbitrary as the GRE requirement, which it
perceived as almost totally irrelevant to teaching ability. The holding
reflects the court's desire to render a decision grounded in the
simplest rule of law applicable to the issues in the case. The court
quite properly avoided the superfluous and complex issue of discrimination as it relates to the GRE by holding that requirement to be
arbitrary. But the decision does not go far enough in relation to the
requirement of a master's degree. For if that requirement established
a racial classification (and in the state of Mississippi, a substantial
disproportion in the numbers of white and black applicants possessing master's degrees is almost a certainty) the state should have been
compelled, in the court's own words, "to justify the use of such requirements." Moreover, it would have been difficult for the school
system to establish the "necessity" or even the "overriding purpose"
of such regulation when both courts found that
54. Id. at 565.
55. Instant case at 280.
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[t]he policy [13-69 in its entirety] was adopted at a time when Starkville was being pressed both publicly and privately to desegregate its schools and establish a unitary system. The policy was not
actually employed to dismiss incumbent teachers until Starkville
had been ordered by the court to establish a unitary system in Febmary, 1970. The teacher dismissals, alleged by Starkville to have been
part of its new faculty improvement program, came in the wake of
this desegregation order. 56
The court might have remanded the case for a determination of the
racial impact of the masters requirement. But even this was unnecessary, for the defendants conceded that the numbers of blacks and
whites possessing such degrees were disproportionate:
Policy 13-69, as one of its alternates accepts a Masters Degree. The
record does not so reflect but it is a fact that more whites secure or
are able to secure a Masters Degree than blacks.'t
If such is the case, where is the justification that is the burden of
defendants?
The court's reluctance even to reach the issue of discrimination
may stem from the previously noted confusion as to applicable standards of review in cases of this type. It undoubtedly results at least
in part from a reluctance to deny to an employer the use of a bona
fide degree as a qualification in a very degree-conscious profession,
even where it is being implemented as a discriminatory mechanism.
But a more compelling reason for the court's reluctance will become
evident after an examination of how the requirement of a minimum
score on a standardized examination has fared in other cases, and
how it is likely to fare in the future.
Because of recent federal legislation, future teacher qualification
cases will probably be litigated under Title VII, which has been
extended in scope to encompass public employment. 58 However, the
court's task of evaluating the permissibility of a given requirement
will not thereby be facilitated. The dilemma of which standard of
review is applicable under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment will be supplanted by the confusion of interpreting
the Griggs requirement of a business necessity where an employment
requirement establishes a racial classification.5 9 A helpful analysis of
56. Id.
57. Brief for Appellants at 20.
58. See supranote 30.
59. 401 U.S. at 431; accord, Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the concept of "business necessity" is provided by the Fourth Circuit
in Robinson v. Lorillard,60 a case involving a Title VII challenge to
a private employer's seniority system.
It is in determining whether a practice is unlawfully discriminatory
that the business necessity test does come into play. The courts have
recognized that repondents [sic] are sometimes justified in continuing
an employment practice regardless of its differential racial impact.
The classic example of an acceptable practice is an employer's policy, in filling secretarial positions, of hiring only applicants who can
type even though, especially in a limited geographical area, it may
be much more difficult for Negroes than for whites to obtain the
necessary training and experience.
The business necessity test has evolved as the appropriate reagent
for detecting which employment practices are acceptable and which
are invalid because
based on factors that are the functional equiva61
lent of race.
But the "classic example" of typing ability does not afford much
guidance to a court confronted with a teacher's challenge to a required score on a standardized examination. After surveying interpretations of the business necessity rule in cases decided by the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits and by the Supreme Court in Griggs, the court in
Robinson concluded:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged
to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.62

Certainly, as repeatedly argued by appellants in the instant case,
the upgrading of an educational system is a legitimate objective of
a school board. 63 In the abstract, at least, securing competent, qualified teachers could be considered a "business necessity" to the extent
that a school system can be considered a business. Therefore, when
requirements for teachers are struck down in the future, the reason
60.
61.
62.
63.

444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted).
Brief for Appellants at 26 passim.
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asserted will almost surely be a failure to comply with the second of
the three components of a business necessity noted by the Fourth Circuit above: the "challenged practice must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve." A school system will have to
sustain the burden of showing that a challenged employment requirement correlates with teaching ability to an extent which overrides
any discriminatory impact it may have.
Because the instant case fails even to reach the issue of discrimination, it is less significant for what it holds than what it fails to
hold. The Fifth Circuit has shown itself to be quite adept at avoiding
a determination as to what correlation must be shown between an
examination and teaching expertise to compensate for any discriminatory impact established by the examination. In the instant case, it
found the GRE requirement arbitrary and thus an impermissible
means to a permissible and laudatory end. In Baker v. Columbus
Municipal Separate School District,4 it found a similar requirement
impermissible because
the evidence support[ed] the finding below that the appellants'
-purpose in using the NTE [National Teacher Examination] was not
in fact independent of invidious racial discrimination, but was, on
the contrary, used for the purpose of discrimination. 65
It is obvious that, to take the extreme situations exemplified by
these two cases, the use of an examination that is demonstrably irrelevant to teaching ability or, though relevant, is employed as a discriminatory mechanism, will be forbidden. It is equally obvious that
since the improvement of an educational system is a legitimate objective, any criterion which successfully distinguishes between those
teachers who are qualified and those not, will be permissible, despite
any racial classification established thereby.
We look with disfavor upon a test or policy which obviously disadvantages the black teachers, especially when this is due to the past
inferior educational opportunities suffered by them. On the other hand,
we fully recognize that a school district has the responsibility of
providing the best possible education for its pupils, including efforts to constantly improve its faculty. When a test has a valid function in such a process and is fairly applied to all teachers, it outweighs the fact that
it may result in excluding proportionately more
66
blacks than whites.
64. 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. Id. at 1115.

66. Id.
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Clearly, no test of teaching ability will be able to correlate 100 percent with the function it is designed to test. The issue that courts
seem so reluctant to reach is a determination of precisely what test
instruments will be permissible. George Cooper and Richard B. Sobol
in their article dealing with objective testing in employment indicate
that
[t]he well established pattern even for "valid" tests is one of relatively low validity. [Validity is the probability that a high scorer
on the test instrument will perform better in an actual employment
situation than will a lower scorer]. This means in many cases that a
test which statistically accounts for only four or five percent of all the
variance in successful job performance is considered valid. Even the
most valid tests rarely account, in statistical terms, for more than
twenty-five percent of job performance.6"
The onerous task of deciding what validity, in "cold numbers," will
constitute a "business necessity" or "overriding consideration" sufficient to compensate for the racial impact of a particular test instrument clearly falls to the courts. They have been understandably reluctant to rule on the matter, and thus far have managed to avoid
the issue by finding the test instrument impermissible on grounds
such as arbitrariness or intentional use for a discriminatory purpose.08
It is quite likely that courts will be just as equivocal in the future, for
the reasons which follow.
Generally, when scores on standardized examinations are utilized
by school systems as employment requisites, a "minimum cut-off
score" is established, below which no applicant will be considered
for employment. But Cooper and Sobol indicate that
[t]he greatest risk of misweighting occurs in use of a test as an absolute cut-off device. Such use is justifiable only in situations where
there is convincing evidence that those who fall below the prescribed
minimum score will almost certainly not succeed on the job regardless of other nontest factors. 69
67. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAiv. L. Rav.
1598, 1661-62 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Cooper & Sobol]. For a discussion of
the validation of examinations used in employment as it relates to problems of jobrelatedness, see Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 900, 913-17 (1972).
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112
(5th Cir. 1972); instant case.
69. Cooper & Sobol 1668.
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Moreover, because evaluating teaching ability involves a great number of unknown variables, validating a standardized examination
which ostensibly tests this "ability" is a difficult proposition. For
example, to validate an examination purporting to test the ability
of a person to assemble a certain product, a test administrator would
compare the test results with actual job results. A good or "valid"
test would be one for which a high scorer proved efficient at assembling the product. Whether a person is a good worker on an assembly line is a good deal easier to determine than whether a person
is a good teacher. It is difficult to find agreement as to what constitutes "teaching ability" itself, much less its determinants. Therefore,
because any independent determination of teaching ability employed
to establish the validity of a particular test instrument will be qualitative at best, it would be virtually impossible to establish a score
on any standardized examination below which a person could be
considered incompetent to teach. Teaching is quite simply more of
an art than a quantifiable skill. Two people may both be excellent
teachers and yet have diametrically opposed teaching styles and methods of approach. If one begins with the observation that there is no
widely accepted notion of what constitutes a good teacher, adds to
this the inherent error of a standardized examination which fails to
test such important determinants of teaching competence as classroom ability, personality, teacher-student rapport, and enthusiasm,
and compounds this with the marginal validity of generally available
standardized tests currently used to qualify teachers, it becomes
patently obvious that courts will have little difficulty declaring "cut-off
scores" on such tests to be arbitrary.
What criteria, then, are left to the school boards to use in selecting their staff? On the one hand, boards are repeatedly cautioned
that in dismissing teachers or other professionals because of a reduction in staff,
the staff member to be dismissed or demoted must be selected on the
basis of objective and reasonable non-discriminatory
standards from
70
among all the staff of the schiool district.
On the other hand, courts repeatedly invalidate "objective" standardized examinations employed for just this purpose, when they
are the sole criterion considered. Defendants in the instant case, en70. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 459 F.2d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 1972)
(emphasis added).
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trapped in this bewildering paradox, demanded to know what criteria
might be employed by them in their search for qualified teachers:
Will the Court require the continued use of unqualified or less
qualified teachers on the ground of discrimination, because the
black unqualified as well as the white unqualified cannot meet
minimum standard, or more blacks do not meet such minimuma
standards than whites? Or will this Court approve some reasonable
pertinent objective test or standard even though black teachers will
not do as well as white teachers on the average on such test or
standard. At least the school boards
are entitled to have this Court
71
spell out acceptable objective tests.
Their plea was answered only by the court's reticence. However,
three weeks later, in a footnote to Baker v. Columbus Municipal
Separate School District, 2 the court cited the appendices to its decision in United States v. Texas Education Agency, 73 as examples of

"objective, non-racial and reasonable criteria." 74 The criteria cited
with approval by the Fifth Circuit in that case are most revealing.7 5
71. Brief for Appellants at 18-19.

72. 462 F.2d 1112, 1115 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972).
73. 459 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1972).
74. 462 F.2d at 1115.
75. The following is the challenged teacher rating sheet previously employcd by
the La Vega Independent School District, and invalidated by the Fifth Circuit in Texas:
LA VEGA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Teaching Rating Sheet

Nam e of Teacher ...................................................................
1. Education (Maximum score-lO points)
Score ................
Degree ..................
Institution ..................
Degree ..................
Institution ..................
Degree ..................
Institution ..................
2. Work Experience
(Maximum Score-lO points)
Place:
Length of Service

Score ................
Subject Grade Taught

3. Has Teacher taken National Teacher Exam?
Score ................
Yes ............
No ............
Common Score ............
4. Is personal appearance neat and pleasing? ............
Is health good?

Score ................

5. Has teacher exhibited bias or prejudice in any of his or her contacts with
others in this system or elsewhere?
Score ................
Yes ............
No ............
(If answer is yes, score no points, if no, score 10)
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6. Is teacher cooperative in his or her dealings with:
Score ................
(a) Administrators
............
(b) Other teachers
............
(c) Parents
............
(d) Students
............
7. Has teacher exhibited ability to control situations in classroom and elsewvhere? ............
Score ................
8. Has teacher exhibited teaching ability?

............

Score ................
9. Has teacher been willing to accept and perform responsibilities outside the
classroom ? ............
Score ................
Total Score ................
Date ...................
Rate by ........................
Instructionsfor Scoring
1. Score 5 points for Bachelor's degree, 4 more points for Master's degree, and
1 more for 12 or more hours beyond the Master's degree. Total-10 points.
2. Score 1 point per year of experience up to 10 years. Experience beyond 10
years is not scored.
3. Teachers who have not had the National Teachers Exam are not to receive
any score. Those who have taken it and can produce their common score
thereon are to be scored as follows:
Common Score
775 or more
687 to 730
649 to 673
588 to 628
538 to 566

Rating
Outstanding
Excellent
Above Average
Average
Below Average

Point Values
5
4
3
2
1

4. Score 2 points for neat and pleasing appearance, and 3 points for good
health
(Total-5 points).
5. If answer is Yes, score no points. If answer is No, score 10 points.
6. This question has four parts. Each part is worth 5 points if the rating thereon is favorable. Total score on this question is 20 points.
7. This question measures the teacher's ability to maintain discipline. If the
teacher is a good disciplinarian, score a maximum of 15 points. Variations from
poor to good will have to be scored according to the rater's best judgment.
8. This question deals with the teacher's effectiveness as a classroom teacher.
Teachers considered to be good are to receive a total of 20 points on this question. Variations on the scale from poor to good must be scored according to the
rater's best judgment.
9. A teacher's willingness to accept and perform duties outside the classroom
merits 5 points. Maximum score on this question is 5 points.
Each rating must bear the teacher's name who is being rated, the total score,
the date of rating, and the signature of the person doing the rating. This evaluation sheet is to be held in the strictest confidence and filed in the office of the
school principal.
The following are appendices A, B, and C to the United States' supplemental brief to
the Fifth Circuit in Texas, respectively representing teacher rating sheets of Chilton and
Bulloch Counties, and "Objective Criteria Which Have Been Proposed by the United
States":
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APPENDIX A
Chilton County, Colbert County, and
Muscle Shoals Objective Criteria
I.

Teachers
A. Type of Certificate.
B. Number of years of experience:
1. In the teaching profession.
2. In the grade, subject or position which he currently
teaches or occupies, or is applying for.
3. In the system.
C. Degree or degrees held.
D. Endorsement in subject area.
E. Number of hours beyond degree.
F. Number of hours of voluntary participation in in-service
training,workshops, seminars, etc.
II. Principals
A. Degree or degrees held.
B. Number of years of experience:
1. As a principal in this system.
2. As a principal in any system.
3. In education other than as principal.
III.

Coaches

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Degree or degrees held.
Experience in system.
Sports coached and how long.
College participation in what sports.
Experience in administration of athletic program.
1. Total.
2. In system.
3. Administrative positions held.

APPENDIX B
Bulloch County Objective Criteria
A. State Board Certification Status
1. Type of certificate
2. Approved teaching fields
3. If at 4 year level(a) Accepted for 5 year certification study by an institution accredited
by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher
Education.
(b) Amount of credit accumulated to date toward this certification.
4. If at 5 year level(a) Accepted for 6 year certification study by an institution accredited
by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education.
(b) Amount of credit accumulated to date toward this certification,
5. If at 6 year level(a) Accepted for 7 year certification by an institution accredited by
the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education.
(b) Amount of credit accumulated to date toward this certification.
B. Degree or Degrees Earned
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C. Experience
1. In grade, subject or position now held.
2. In grade, subject or position applying for.
3. Experience in any grade, subject or position other than that now held
or applying for.
4. Courses or special training not previously stated that would apply to
present position or position seeking and date.
5. Appointments or elections to professional groups, workshops, seminars,
etc.
D. Professional Honors, Awards, Citations, Publication, etc.

APPENDIX C
Objective Criteria Which Have Been
Proposed by the United States
1. Teachers
I. Professional Preparation
A. Certificate
Non-Certified Teacher-No Degree
0
Certified Teacher-No Degree
5
Certified Teacher-Bachelor's
Degree (Teaching out of area(s)
of certification)
20
Certified Teacher-Master's
Degree (Teaching out of area(s)
of certification)
30
Certified Teacher-Bachelor's
Degree, highest degree held
(Teaching in area(s) of
certification)
40
Certified Teacher-Master's
Degree and above (Teaching
in area(s) of certification)
70
B. Credit Hours
One point for each semester credit hour earned beyond degree held.
II. Teaching Experience
Ten (10) points per year up to 20 years; maximum pomts-200
2. Principals
I. Professional Preparation
A. Certificate
Non-Certified-No Degree
0
Certified-No Degree
5
Certified-Bachelor's
Degree (Certificate in area
other than administration)
20
Certified-Master's Degree
(Certificate in area other
than administration)
30
Certified-Master's Degree
and above (Certificate in
administration)
70
B. Credit Hours
One point for each semester credit hou reamed beyond degree held.
673
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Upon examination of the criteria for teacher evaluation which
the court invalidated in Texas, it is evident that most are capable
of subjective interpretion, and indeed the court stated that it
agree[s] . . . that all but the first three categories on the teacher
rating sheet are essentially subjective in nature .... 71
However, an examination of the "objective criteria" found in appendices A, B, and C and approved by the court, reveals not a single
means of evaluating a teacher's classroom performancel There is not
one criterion that cannot be represented by a piece of paper: degrees
held, certification, number of credit hours, number of years of teaching experience. Is it self-evident that the teacher with the highest
degree and the greatest number of years behind him is so superior to
the teacher fresh from college? If not, it is at least clear that faced
with the prospect of overseeing the hiring and dismissal of teachers,
and caught between the specter of subjectivity (with its invitation
to the indulgence of personal prejudice) and objectivity (in the form
of inherently biased standardized tests) the court is looking with
ever-increasing favor upon academic degrees as a legitimate index
of teacher competence. The rationale of the instant case at once
becomes clear: the courts have eliminated virtually all other subjective and objective indices of teacher performance, and academic degrees are the sole remaining criteria by which courts may assess a
teacher's qualifications. Were the court to invalidate the masters requirement, it would complete its usurpation of the function of the
school board, and, in the process, leave itself no means by which to
accomplish its evaluative purpose. The court is quite simply unwilling
to challenge the treasured American assumption that an academic
degree represents an automatic qualification in any given field.
This, then, most probably portends the unfortunate trend of
the future: subjective considerations will be all but forbidden as
evaluative criteria, especially where there is a history of de jure
racial discrimination, as in virtually every school in the South. StandIf. Experience
As Teacher
Five (5) points per year up to 20 years. Do not count years as both
teacher and principal.
B. As Principal
Ten (10) points per year up to 20 years. Count years as both principal
and teacher as principal.
76. 459 F.2d at 606.
A.
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dardized examinations, when permitted to be used at all, will have
to be conjoined with other "more valid" criteria and properly
weighted (i.e., not heavily relied upon) and never used as a "cutoff" or minimum requirement. Finally, academic degrees will become
the most acceptable and therefore the most valued teacher qualification.
The development of such a trend will be unfortunate not only
because it is likely to result in the nation's classrooms being conducted
by academically qualified people, many of whom may simply not be
good teachers. It will be unfortunate because it will represent the presupposition on the part of the courts of the very issue being challenged in the instant case, which is by no means self-evident: that an
academic degree is a valid determinant of teaching ability. As well respected as they are in this country, degrees should not be permitted
to escape the scrutiny of stringent equal protection and Title VII
standards when used as a sine qua non for employment. Where the
requirement of an academic degree establishes a racial classification,
it should be "demonstrably a measure of job performance," 77 and its
correlation with teaching ability should be shown to be as great as
that for permissible standardized exams. Courts would do well to reflect upon this caveat from the Supreme Court in Griggs:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with examples
of men and women who rendered highly effective performance
without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of
certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense
proposition that
78
they are not to become masters of reality.
JONATHAN I.

77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971).
78. Id. at 433.
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